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RECENT DECISIONS
a date is fixed within which the company is bound to pay up the "shares," and
whether it appears that the parties intended that the interests of the "share-
holders" be subordinated to the interest of the creditors at large in case the
company should become insolvent. Kidd v. Puritan Cereal Food Co., 145 Mo.
App. 502, 122 S.W. 784 (1909). Where no time is fixed when the principal shall
become due and payable, the certificate itself cannot create a debt. Jefferson
Banking Co. v. Trustees of Martin Institute, 146 Ga. 389, 91 S.E. 463 (1917).
It has been held that the fact that certificates provide that they "shall be a
preferred lien on the assets of the Company" does not make the holder a credi-
tor, when it is manifest from the certificate construed as a whole that the
corporation never intended to make him one, but merely to give him a lien
on the assets of the corporation when in liquidation, over the common stock-
holders. Weaver Power Co. v. Elk Mountain Mill Co., 154 N.C. 76, 69 S.E. 747
(1910).
In the instant case there was a definite promise to pay a fixed sum within a
fixed period. The separate instruments apparently contained all the essential ele-
ments of promissory notes. In a case where the promotion scheme was com-
parable to the one carried out in the instant case and where the participating
"operation certificates" were secured by a trust deed on all the premises, the
court held that the holders were profit-sharers and co-adventurers. United States
and Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas and Oil Service Co., 19 F. (2d) 624
(W.D. Pa. 1924). It is important to notice that in the latter case no fixed date
for payment was prescribed in the certificates. And in the latter case the con-
troversy developed between holders of the certificates and a receiver represent-
ing general creditors over the fund which had been built up from percentage
contributions out of gross sales. In the instant case the controversy was not one
between the certificate holders and general creditors. The corporation had been
adjudged a bankrupt. The properties had been sold by the trustee in bankruptcy.
At the time no issue between certificate holders and general creditors with
respect to recourse against the company's assets or the proceeds from the sale
had been raised. The purchaser from the trustee took with notice of the
asserted encumbrance. It does not appear how much the purchaser paid. It is
submitted that the equities are with the certificate holders as against a pur-
chaser like the one in the instant case who probably paid little more than enough
to carry the costs of the bankruptcy administration. But the court's apparent
willingness to decide this case according to its "interpretation" of the instru-
ments may be hard to explain if the court ever has to decide a case just like
the Keystone Gas Co. case.
EDWARD J. KuLiG.
CORPORATIONs-SERvICE OF PROcEss-FoR'IGN CoRPoRATioNs DOING BusINEss
WITHOUT A LicENsE.-The defendant, an automobile manufacturer, pleaded in
abatement to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that no valid service
was made as it was not present or found in the state. Prior to November, 1935,
the defendant had a Boston distributor who contacted all the dealers. The sales
were understood to be made at Detroit and the distributor was not an agent.
The distributor went out of business in November and a district manager took
over the duties so the local dealers could get automobiles. His office was in a
building which was owned by a corporation and the stock of such corporation
was owned entirely by the defendant. The defendant sent him its own stationery
to use. He sent all the dealers' orders on to Detroit. He arranged for the show-
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ing of defendant's automobiles at the current auto show; he stored some of the
cars after the show for the defendant until they could be shipped to another
dealer; he sold automobiles of the defendant which were owned by finance
companies to another dealer; and he signed new dealers. The court held that
when the service was made on the district manager the defendant was doing
business in the state and had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the state.
Atlantic NatL. Bank of Boston v. Hupp Motor Car Corp., (Mass. 1937) 10 N.E.
(2d) 131.
The question of whether an unlicensed foreign corporation is under the
jurisdiction of the state court is two sided: can it sue in the court [see (1937)
21 MARQ. L. REv. 94], and is it subject to the process of the court? Whether
a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the state has subjected itself
to the process of the state for a personal action depends on the peculiar facts
of each case, but the courts have laid down certain rules which act as guides in
determining this question. Where a railroad was not licensed to do business in
the state, and it had no line through the state, but had an agent in the state for
the solicitation of passengers and freight in interstate commerce, and where the
cause of action did not arise out of such solicitation, it was held that the rail-
road was not doing business within the state so as to give jurisdiction; but the
question was mooted whether solicitation alone would be enough to confer juris-
diction under the light of a statute, in an action growing out of the solicitation
and where the cause of action arose within the state. Thurman v. C. M. & St.
P. Ry., 254 Mass. 569, 151 N.E. 63, 46 A.L.R. 563 (1926). Where an agent of
a New Jersey newspaper had an office in New York, and merely solicited orders
for the paper, the agent having nothing to do with the contracts relating to the
machinery, equipment, the editorial policy, the gathering or publishing of news,
the court held that service on the agent was invalid. Laurucella v. Evening News
Publishing Co., 15 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. N.Y. 1936). It also appears that where
the business is nothing more than an isolated transaction, and not one of many,
the unlicensed foreign corporation has not made itself amenable to the
process of the courts of that state where the isolated transaction took place.
Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Curtin-Howe Corp., (Iowa, 1937) 274 N.W.
78. There must be a continuous course of business, and even though the action
arose out of the isolated transaction, the Iowa court held that service on the
Secretary of State, which was allowed under statute, was invalid. The mere
fact that a foreign corporation has a subsidiary in the state where the action is
brought does not make the corporation amenable to process. Peterson v. C. R. I.
& P. Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 513, 51 L.ed. 841 (1907). Nor would the
fact that a bank located in one state with correspondent banks in New York,
the correspondent bank paying the drafts drawn against the letters of credit
issued by the foreign bank, receiving and delivering securities from brokers for
the foreign bank, and carrying out the general duties of a bank, make the foreign
bank subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts. Bank of America v.
Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 43 Sup. Ct. 311, 67 L.ed. 594
(1923). It is also held that the mere presence of an officer of a foreign corpora-
tion in a state is not sufficient presence so that it can be said that he has brought
the corporation with him for the purposes of subjecting it to the jurisdiction of
the court. The officer must intend to bring the corporation into the state for
that purpose, and even though the officer is present for one isolated piece of
business service cannot be made. "The business carried on to bring the corpora-
tion within the state must be of such a nature and character as to warrant the
inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction, and
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is by its duly authorized agents, present within the state where service is at-
tempted." State, ex rel. Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85,
88, 53 Sup. Ct. 529, 77 L.ed. 1047 (1933), reversing a decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. Cf. People Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. American Tobacco Co., 246
U.S. 79, 87, 38 Sup. Ct. 233, 62 L.ed. 587, 590 (1918). Nor can a state burden
interstate commerce by using its process on foreign corporations engaged in such
commerce, but this fact alone, that they are engaged in such commerce, does
not render the corporation immune from the ordinary process of the courts of
the state. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 589, 34 Sup. Ct. 944,
58 L.ed. 1479 (1914). In Wisconsin see American Food Produce v. Ameri-
can Milling Co., 151 Wis. 385, 138 N.W. 1123 (1912), where there was a dispute
as to the service on the defendant foreign corporation, and where the court held
that it was immaterial whether the officer served was in the state on the business
of the corporation, since the corporation owned property within the state, and
such service was allowed by statute; and Tetley, Sletter & Dahl v. Rock Falls
Mfg. Co., 176 Wis. 400, 187 N.W. 204 (1922), where the agent of the foreign
corporation served had been soliciting orders in the state for four years, and
where the corporation was engaged in interstate commerce, and where the court
held that mere presence of the agent in the state was not sufficint to give the
court jurisdiction, but that the fact that the corporation carried on interstate
commerce through duly authorized agents did not exempt it from suit within
the state; and the recent case, Petition of Northfield Iron Co., (Wis. 1938) 277
N.W. 168, where the court held that the foreign corporation was doing business
within the state and could be served with process through its agent whom it had
appointed to carry out a contemplated continuous course of sales, although the
agent had effected only two sales when service was made upon him.
JOHN BURKE.
COURTS-PROHIITION-WIiERE SmitLAR ACrION IS PENDING IN FEDERAL
CouRT.-One John Clancy, a resident of Illinois, brought an action in federal
court in Illinois against one Louis Phelan, a resident of Wisconsin. The action
was to recover money alleged to be due by reason of a sale by Phelan to Clancy
of an interest in an invention. After the action was at issue and set down for an
early trial, Clancy commenced an action in the Circuit Court of Rock County, on
the same cause. He also subpoenaed Phelan to appear at an adverse examination
and to produce a great number of papers and documents. A similar examination
had been taken in the suit in federal court. Phelan moved for an order to stay
all proceedings in the state court pending the trial in federal court. The Wis-
consin circuit court refused to stay any of the proceedings, and Phelan petitioned
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for a writ of prohibition. Held, the writ of
prohibition issues. "Where an action similar in all respects, involving the same
issues and the same parties, is pending in a court of the United States, which
action is at issue and set down for an early trial and where the action in the
state court has been commenced after the commencement of the action in the
federal court, in the absence of a showing that it is reasonably necessary for
the protection of some substantial right of a party that proceedings be also had
in a court of this state, the state court should unquestionably defer to the
jurisdiction of the federal court and stay all proceedings in the action in its
court, unless the action in the federal court be dismissed, leaving the state court
free to proceed without conflicting with the jurisdiction of the federal court"
In re Phelan, (Wis. 1937) 274 N.W. 411.
1938]
